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Abstract
Th e sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone and increased pressures for ‘structural reform’ 
have led to a period of intensive change in labour market policy in Southern Europe. 
Examining the cases of Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy, this article focuses on the 
security of labour market insiders, a key group in labour markets that is highly segmented. 
Th e security of labour market insiders is conceptualised as consisting of security in 
employment (protection against dismissals) and security in unemployment (protection 
against drops in income provided by unemployment insurance and assistance). Using 
changes in national laws, the article charts and compares labour market change along 
these two dimensions across these four Southern European countries. Because labour 
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market reform has not been restricted to Southern Europe, the article also compares 
these developments to broader changes in the countries of the Eurozone, using OECD 
and MISSOC data. Having demonstrated the degree to which the security of labour 
market insiders has diminished, the article concludes with an agenda for research on 
the policy dynamics of Southern European labour market reform in the wake of the 
fi nancial crisis.
Keywords: employment security; Greece; Italy; labour market policy; labour market 
insiders; Portugal; Southern Europe; Spain; structural reform
1. INTRODUCTION
Following the eruption of a sovereign debt crisis in May 2010, the Greek government 
adopted an Economic Adjustment Programme in exchange for fi nancial assistance 
provided by the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the IMF, 
commonly referred to as the Troika. Th is event marked the start of a period of 
intensive institutional change in the South of Europe. Under pressure from fi nancial 
markets, international institutions and creditor countries within the European 
Union, countries in the South were prompted to introduce ‘structural’ reforms in the 
way they regulate their labour markets.1 As is evident from Table 1, labour market 
reform activity was both intensive, involving numerous reforms over a very short 
period of time, and comprehensive, covering a wide range of areas, from employment 
protection legislation, wage-costs, internal fl exibility and unemployment protection 
to collective bargaining and even active labour market policy.
Cross-national studies of the reforms introduced in this period are limited, and 
oft en focus on a broader set of cases. Th ere is, of course, a growing base of country-
specifi c analysis of the reforms (see Baylos 2012; Bentolila and Jansen 2012; Martin 
Puela 2011; Valdés Dal-Ré 2011; Loy 2012; Raitano 2012; Papadimitriou 2012; 
Matsaganis 2013; ILO 2011; Karamessini 2012 2015; Koukiadaki and Kretsos 2012; 
Laskos and Tsakalotos 2013; ILO 2014; Ramalho 2013). However, there have been few 
attempts to look at these developments through a comparative lens, and they have 
important limitations. For example, most of the comparative studies focus more 
on the reforms introduced in reaction to the ‘Great Recession’ (see Tajgman et al. 
2011; ECB 2012; Laulom et al. 2012) than on the most recent developments (OECD 
2012; OECD 2013; Clauwaert and Schömann 2012). Th ere are also few studies that 
focus specifi cally on developments in the South of Europe (see Meardi 2012). While 
these comparative studies usefully chart changes in policy, most do not assess the 
signifi cance of this period of institutional reform. Th is article aims to fi ll this gap.
1 In addition to labour market reforms, Southern European countries have also been prompted to 
introduce reforms to the regulation of product markets, oft en through the opening up of regulated 
professions and services (e.g. Greece, Italy and Portugal).
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Table 1. Labour market reforms in the South of Europe: 2010–2013 
Greece Portugal Spain Italy
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Th e signifi cance of these reforms lies, fi rst of all, in the way they reshape the model 
of labour market regulation in the South of Europe. As Muff els (2013: 218) points 
out, Southern European labour markets share an insider-oriented segmented labour 
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market, characterised by high levels of employment protection for labour market 
insiders and a large number of atypical workers with very low levels of security. 
Karamessini (2008: 517) has argued that, historically, the stringent legislation against 
individual and collective dismissals was meant to protect male breadwinners. It 
refl ects the legacy of authoritarian corporatism coupled with a family-oriented 
ideology, along with the social unrest and political change of the 1970s and 1980s. 
Although the four countries examined here followed diff erent paths to fl exibility from 
the 1980s to the late 2000s, these invariably reinforced labour market segmentation 
by creating fl exibility on the margins of the labour market while leaving those with 
permanent contracts largely protected. In line with this, this article assesses whether 
the reforms introduced between 2010 and 2013 aff ected the level of security enjoyed 
by labour market insiders in the South of Europe.
Th e article is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the policy changes 
introduced between 2010 and 2013. Section 3 assesses how these reforms changed 
the institutional setting that defi nes the security of labour market insiders in the 
South of Europe (Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece). In order to better understand 
the signifi cance of these reforms, this section also expands this exercise to include 
all countries in the Eurozone. Section 4 concludes by refl ecting on how the results 
presented here can help shape future research on the impact of the crisis on the 
regulation of Southern European labour markets.
1. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION
We used a two-pronged research method in this study. For Section 2, we reviewed 
national laws in Greece, Portugal, Spain and Italy to develop a list of changes to 
dismissal procedures, unemployment insurance and unemployment which we 
then grouped into distinct categories. For Sections 3 and 4, we used data from the 
OECD Benefi ts and Wages Indicators and MISSOC databases. We applied these 
data to modifi ed versions of the indices of security in employment and security in 
unemployment developed by Papadopoulos (2005). Detailed information on the 
procedures is discussed in the relevant sections.
2. REDEFINING SECURITY IN SOUTHERN EUROPEAN 
LABOUR MARKETS
In this section we look at how reforms introduced during the period between 2010 
and 2013 have redefi ned the security of labour market insiders in Southern Europe. 
Following Papadopoulos (2005: 20–22), we argue that the security of insiders depends 
on the degree to which labour market institutions off er protection against two 
fundamental risks: (1) the risk of (individual or collective) dismissal, i.e. security 
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in employment; and (2) the risk of a sustained drop in income aft er the loss of 
employment, i.e. security in unemployment.
2.1. SECURITY IN EMPLOYMENT
As can be seen from Table 2, in recent years the level of employment security of 
regular workers in Southern Europe has been subject to signifi cant change. Reforms 
introduced during this period were mainly concerned with lowering the cost to 
employers of dismissing regular workers (for an overview of reforms in Greece and 
Portugal under the Memoranda of Understanding, see also Petmesidou and Glatzer 
2015). In Portugal, the new Labour Code, introduced in 2012, cut severance payments 
from 30 to 20 days per year and set a benefi t ceiling of 12 times the employee’s monthly 
wage or 240 times the minimum wage.2 In Greece (in 2013), private sector employees 
saw the notice period for individual dismissals reduced from a maximum of 24 to a 
maximum of 4 months and the level of severance pay cut from 2–24 months to 1–6 
months (with prior notice) or 2–12 months (without prior notice). Severance pay for 
workers with more than 17 years of service was reduced from 24 to 12 months’ wages 
(Karamessini 2015).
In Spain, in 2010, the Socialist government decided to expand the use of the 
Contrato de Fomento del Empleo, which was originally restricted to young people up 
to age 30, to those up to age 44 (Law 35/2010 of 17 September). Th is law provides lower 
compensation in the case of dismissal (33 days per year, compared to 45 for regular 
workers) and requires neither advance notice nor payment of interim wages. Later, 
in 2012, the Conservative government reduced severance pay to 20 days per year of 
tenure, with a maximum of 12 times the Spanish minimum monthly wage.3
Perhaps to soft en the impact of these cuts in severance payments or perhaps in 
response to deteriorating economic conditions, Portugal (2013) and Italy (2012) 
introduced dismissal compensation funds (see Table 2). In Portugal (in 2013), 
the Conservative coalition introduced not one but two schemes4 ‒ the Fundo de 
Compensação do Trabalho (FCT) and the Fundo de Garantia de Compensação do 
Trabalho (FGCT) ‒ both funded by employers. FCT is an individualised fund that each 
employer must create for each employee, which capitalises on monthly contributions 
corresponding to 0.925 per cent of the worker’s wage, and can be used by the employer 
to pay up to 50 per cent of the total severance pay. FGCT is a mutual fund which 
capitalises on monthly contributions corresponding to 0.075 per cent of one’s wage, 
and can be used by the employee if s/he does not receive at least 50 per cent of the 
severance pay s/he is due.
2 Th is applied to both new and old contracts, although only to the time spent in the company since 
November 2011. Law no. 23/2012, Article 366, no.1.
3 Law 3 /2012 of 6 July.
4 Law 70/2013.
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Besides reducing the cost of individual dismissal, countries in the South of Europe 
have sought to weaken the regime that protects regular workers against the risk of 
unfair dismissal. In Italy, following the 2012 labour market reform, fi rms with more 
than 15 employees are no longer automatically required to rehire employees in the 
event of unfair dismissal due to economic reasons. Th e duty of reinstatement was 
replaced by monetary sanctions that range from 6 to 24 months’ wages depending 
on the length of employment (Clauwaert and Schömann 2013c: 7–9). In Spain, the 
Conservative government in 2012 reduced compensation for unfair dismissal for 
permanent contracts from 45 days of wages per year of tenure (with a ceiling of 42 
months’ wages) to 33 days per year of tenure (with a ceiling of 24 months).5
In Spain, consecutive governments have sought to broaden the ability of employers 
to dismiss employees for economic reasons. In 2010 new legislation allowed dismissals 
in the case of persistent drops in sales or revenues.6 In 2011, this regime was further 
expanded and dismissal permitted when it was part of a process of technological or 
organisational change aimed at improving the company’s situation. In 2012, to reduce 
challenges to dismissals in the judicial system, the Spanish government introduced 
legislation that specifi es that dismissals for economic reasons are only possible when 
the employer is able to demonstrate drops (including expected drops) in sales or 
revenues for three consecutive quarters.7
In Portugal, as part of the 2012 Labour Code, the government introduced 
profound changes with the goal of facilitating individual dismissals. Th is involved 
broadening the interpretation of fair dismissal in the case of unsuitability for the 
task, eliminating the regulation that protected senior workers in cases of dismissal, 
and eliminating the requirement that employers off er an alternative job in cases 
of unfair dismissal (Ramalho 2013: 9). However, in 2013, the Constitutional Court 
deemed these changes to the Labour Code unconstitutional.8 As a consequence, in 
2014, the Portuguese government introduced legislation that defi nes the new criteria 
that employers must use when determining individual or collective dismissals.9 
Under these new rules priority for dismissal is given to individuals with the lowest 
evaluations of performance, the lowest qualifi cations, the highest costs to the 
company, the lowest level of experience, and the fewest number of years in the 
company (in this order).
5 Law 3 /2012 of 6 July.
6 Law 35 /2010 of 17 September.
7 Law 3 /2012 of 6 July.
8 Th e elimination of the requirement that employers follow seniority when extinguishing a given 
position was deemed to open the way for the employer to discriminate among workers, which 
would violate the prohibition against unfair dismissal enshrined in Article 53 of the Constitution. 
Th e Court found that the elimination of the obligation to fi nd a compatible position for a worker 
before his/her dismissal also violated the constitutional prohibition against unfair dismissal (see 
Constitutional Court Ruling no. 602/2013 in Diário da República (24 /10/2013).
9 Law 27/2014.
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Table 2. Changes to security in employment in Southern Europe 2010–2013
Policy
Area
Country Year Policy Changes
Notifi cation Procedure
Greece 2010 – Notice period reduced from maximum of 24 to maximum of 6 
months
2013 – Notice period reduced from maximum of 6 to maximum of 4 
months
Spain 2011 – Notice period reduced from 30 to 15 days
Severance Pay
Greece 2010 – Severance pay cut from 2–24 months’ wages to 1–6 months 
(with prior notice) or 2–12 (without prior notice)
2013 – Severance pay for workers with more than 17 years of service 
reduced from 24 to 12 months’ wages.
Spain 2012 – Simpler modalities for economic redundancies, compensated at 
20 days per year
Portugal 2012
2013
– Cut and introduction of a ceiling to severance pay
– Introduction of dismissal compensation fund
Italy 2012 – Introduction of a dismissal compensation fund
Length of Trial Period
Greece 2010 – Extension of the probation period from 2 to 12 months
Unfair Dismissal: Defi nition, Compensation & Reinstatement
Spain 2010 – Economic reasons become a justifi able reason for dismissal
– Compensation for unfair dismissal reduced
2011 – Defi nition of fair dismissal was extended
– Obligation of reinstatement in the case of unfair dismissal is 
replaced by monetary sanctions
2012 – Compensation for unfair dismissal is reduced from 45 days’ 
wages for every year worked (up to a ceiling of 42 months’ 
wages) to 33 days (with a ceiling of 24 months’ wages)
Portugal 2012 – Factors that justify dismissals broadened 
Italy 2012 – Restrictions to the right to reinstatement in case of unfair 
dismissal due to economic reasons
Greece 2013 – Protection against unfair dismissal reduced.
Defi nition of Collective Dismissal
Spain 2012 – Collective dismissals are no longer dependent on authorisation 
from public authorities
– Persistent or foreseen drops in sales/revenues (in three 
consecutive quarters) become a reason for fair dismissal 
Greece 2010 – Increase in the minimum threshold for collective dismissals 
from 2–3% to 10% of employees
Portugal 2012 – Seniority is no longer a criteria for determining dismissals
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In addition to making individual dismissals easier, almost all countries have 
taken steps to facilitate collective dismissals (see Table 2). In Greece, in 2010, the 
minimum threshold for collective dismissals was increased from 2–3 per cent to 10 
per cent (Karamessini, 2015). In Spain, since 2012, collective dismissals are no longer 
dependent on authorisation from national, regional or local authorities. Moreover, the 
period between notice and dismissals was reduced (OECD 2013: 96).
2.2. SECURITY IN UNEMPLOYMENT
As can be seen in Table 3, there have been substantial changes to the systems of 
unemployment protection in the South of Europe. Th e most common measure 
was a cut in the level of unemployment insurance benefi ts. Th us, in 2012, the 
Greek government decided to cut unemployment insurance benefi ts by 22 per cent 
(Matsaganis 2013: 20). In Spain (in 2012), the Conservative government decided that, 
aft er 6 months on benefi t, unemployment insurance recipients would get only 50 per 
cent of their previous salary, not 60 per cent as was previously the case.
In Portugal, in 2010, the Socialist government cut the unemployment benefi t 
from 65 per cent of gross earnings in the previous job, to the lower of 75 per cent 
of net earnings or 3 times the Social Support Index (SSI). In 2012, the Conservative 
government introduced further cuts in the level and duration of unemployment 
insurance benefi ts. Th e cap on unemployment insurance benefi ts was reduced from 
€ 1.257 to € 1048.10 In addition to this, the Government introduced a 10 per cent cut 
in benefi ts aft er 6 months.11 Still, the Government did approve a 10 per cent increase 
in benefi ts for unemployed couples (and lone parents) with children.12 However, later 
in 2013, the government decided to impose a 6 per cent tax levy on unemployment 
benefi ts above € 419.13
Besides cutting the level of payments, some countries decided to slash the duration 
of unemployment benefi ts. Th is was the case in Portugal where, in 2012, the maximum 
duration of unemployment benefi ts was reduced from 900 to 540 days.14 It was also 
the case in Greece where, in 2011, the government introduced limits on the number of 
days a person could receive unemployment insurance over a period of 4 years, to 450 
days in 2013 and 400 days in 2014 (Matsaganis 2013: 20).
10 Law no. 64/2012, Article 29, no. 1.
11 Law no. 64/2012, Article 28, no. 2.
12 Law no. 64/2012, Article 2, no. 1.
13 Law no. 51/2013, Article 10, no. 2.
14 See Law no. 220/2006, Article 37, no. 1 and Law no. 64/2012, Article 37, no. 1.
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Table 3. Changes to security in unemployment in Southern Europe 2010–2013*
Policy 
Area
Country Year Policy Changes
Unemployment Insurance – Eligibility
Portugal 2012 – Minimum contributory period reduced from 450 to 360 days
Italy 2012 – New unemployment insurance scheme (ASpI), which extends 
protection to apprentices and artists.
– Introduction of the Mini-ASpI, replacing the previous reduced 
requirement unemployment benefi t.
– Elimination of the ‘Mobilità’ allowance (for workers in medium 
and large fi rms) 
Greece 2012 – Unemployment insurance extended to self-employed
Unemployment Insurance – Generosity of Unemployment Benefi ts
Spain 2012 – Cut in benefi t aft er 6 months of receipt is strengthened (from 
60% to 50% of previous salary)
Portugal 2010 – Benefi t cut from 65% of gross earnings in the previous job, to 
75% of net earnings
– Introduction of a € 1257 ceiling on benefi ts 
2012 – Benefi t ceiling cut from € 1257 to € 1048 Euros
– Benefi t cut by 10% aft er 6 months
2013 – UI Benefi t cut by 6% (tax levy)
Greece 2012 – Flat-rate unemployment benefi t reduced by 22%
Unemployment Insurance – Duration of Unemployment Benefi ts
Portugal 2012 – Cuts in the duration of benefi ts – maximum duration reduced 
from 38 to 26 months
Italy 2012 – New unemployment insurance scheme (ASpI), extends duration 
of payments. 
Greece 2012 – Limit to the number of days a person is entitled to receive benefi ts 
over a period of 4 years (450 in 2013, 400 from 2014 onwards).
Unemployment Assistance
Spain 2011 – 6 month special allowance (PRODI) for people over 45 was 
eliminated and replaced by an individual retraining programme 
(PREPARA)
Italy 2012 – New unemployment assistance scheme (Mini-ASpI) for 
employees with reduced contributions.
Portugal 2010 – Tightening of means-test (less generous equivalence scale)
2012 – Duration of benefi ts cut by half for recipients under 40
Greece 2012 – Annual income threshold that serves as a means-test increased 
from € 5,000 to € 12,000
2013 – Annual income threshold that serves as a means-test reduced 
from € 12,000 to € 10,000
– Cap on public expenditure on unemployment assistance
– Unemployed assistance extended to young long-term 
unemployed
Note: 
* Th is does not include the withdrawal of stimulus measures introduced as a response to the ‘Great 
Recession’.
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In a context of rapid growth in unemployment, there were modest eff orts to expand 
the coverage of unemployment insurance schemes. In Spain, Law 32/2010 established 
a voluntary contribution to unemployment benefi t for the self-employed, even if, due 
to excessive requirements, fewer than 20% of requests were resolved favourably.15 
In Greece (2012), unemployment insurance was extended to self-employed workers. 
However, due to stringent eligibility criteria, very few of the self-employed who found 
themselves out of business had access to benefi ts (Karamessini, 2015).16 In Portugal (in 
2012), the mandatory contributory period to be eligible for unemployment insurance 
benefi ts was reduced from 450 to 360 days (in the last 730 days).17
Probably the most substantial eff ort to improve the coverage of unemployment 
insurance benefi ts in the South of Europe was the introduction, in Italy in 2012, of 
the Assicurazione Sociale per l’Impiego (ASpI) scheme, which replaced a rather broken 
web of individual schemes with a more unifi ed system of unemployment protection 
that also encompassed apprentices, who were previously not covered. Under the new 
scheme, all employees who had started to work as an employee at least two years 
before becoming unemployed and who have worked at least 52 weeks since then are 
entitled to unemployment protection for a period of 12 months. Th e benefi t amounts 
to 75 per cent of the previous wage, up to a threshold, which starts to decrease aft er 6 
months of receipt (Raitano 2012).
While it attempts to expand the coverage of unemployment protection, the new 
system still contains important gaps in coverage. As it maintains the eligibility 
requirements of the ordinary unemployment benefi t, the ASpI fails to protect 
some categories of workers ‒ employees working for less than two years, or with an 
intermittent working history ‒ who are particularly prevalent among the younger 
generations. Moreover, the new scheme does not create new guarantees for the 
self-employed and, in particular, for para-subordinate workers, i.e. continuous 
and project collaborators, whose designation as self-employed is oft en questionable 
(Raitano 2012).
It should also be noted that, starting in 2015, the 2012 reform abolished the mobility 
allowance. Th is was the most generous unemployment benefi t in Italy because it lasted 
up to two years with an 80 per cent replacement rate. However, the mobility allowance 
was granted only to those working either in industrial fi rms with at least 16 employees 
or in service fi rms with at least 50 employees.
Although they are less relevant to the protection of labour market insiders, 
Southern European countries have also made important changes to the eligibility 
15 Available at www.segsocial.es/Internet_1/Estadistica/Est/Otras_Prestaciones_de_la_Seguridad_
Social/ceseactividadRETA/ Ceseactividad2013/index.htm.
16 Th e unemployment insurance scheme is now open to self-employed workers whose annual personal 
income is below € 10,000 (or with annual family income below € 10,000, averaged over the two 
years prior to claiming) who have ceased their activity aft er January 2012, and have paid social 
contributions for at least 12 months in the last three years, and are not in debt to social security 
(Matsaganis 2013: 21).
17 Law no. 64/2012, Article 22, no. 1.
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and generosity of non-contributory unemployment benefi ts. In 2010, as part of an 
initial attempt to deal with the onset of the sovereign debt crisis, the Portuguese 
government introduced a series of welfare cuts which involved, among other things, 
the tightening of eligibility for assistance-based schemes, accomplished through the 
introduction of a less generous equivalence scale (Moreira et al. 2014: 247).18 Later, in 
2012, the Conservative coalition cut by half the duration of unemployment assistance 
for recipients under 40.19 In Spain (in 2011) the Socialist government decided to 
eliminate the 6 months special allowance (PRODI) that was previously available to 
people over 45 who had exhausted their unemployment insurance right. In its place, 
the government introduced PREPARA, an individual retraining programme which 
acts as a safety-net for unemployed persons who have exhausted all benefi ts and 
allowances.20
In Italy, where there are no non-contributory unemployment benefi ts, in parallel 
to the introduction of the ASpI programme, the government introduced the Mini-
ASPI scheme. It is paid to employees who do not fulfi l ASpI requirements and replaces 
the previous reduced requirement unemployment benefi t – traditionally, directed at 
seasonal workers or at those with very short working periods. Benefi ts are calculated 
using the same formula as in ASpI (the replacement rates are the same), but payments 
only last half of the previous worked weeks, with a maximum of six months. Under 
the scheme, entitlement to unemployment protection is possible if the individual has 
worked for the 13 weeks prior to the dismissal.
Possibly as a consequence of the complexity of the Greek political situation 
during this period, we fi nd a number of contradictory developments regarding 
the fi nal safety-net for unemployed workers. Th us, in 2012, the Greek authorities 
introduced a (small) reform, which involved raising the annual income threshold 
that serves as a means-test from € 5,000 to € 12,000, to broaden the coverage of the 
unemployment assistance scheme. However, this was followed by a decision to reduce 
the annual income threshold to € 10,000 from January 2014, and to limit government 
expenditure on the scheme to € 35 million, which in eff ect restricts the number of 
recipients to about 14,500. In another change, in 2013 the Greek government decided 
to expand the scheme to cover the young (and not just the old) long-term unemployed 
(Matsaganis 2013: 21).
18 Th e previous legislation used a fairly generous equivalence scale, which entitled each adult, up to 
two adults, to 100 per cent of the amount of the Social Pension and each adult, from the third, to 
70 per cent of that amount. Each minor, up to two, was entitled to 50 per cent of the amount of the 
Social Pension and, from the third minor, received 60%. Th e new Act adopts the OECD equivalence 
scale, in which the second adult in the household receives 70 per cent of the benefi t of the head 
benefi ciary, and each child receives 50 per cent (Moreira et al. 2014:247).
19 Decree 64/2012.
20 PREPARA replaces the Temporary Unemployment Protection and Insertion Programme (PRODI) 
(Royal Decree-Law 10/2009 of 13 August), launched in August 2009, whose goal was also to provide 
some income to workers who had exhausted their unemployment benefi t or subsidies.
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3. REDRAFTING THE BALANCE BETWEEN 
SECURITY IN EMPLOYMENT AND SECURITY 
IN UNEMPLOYMENT FOR REGULAR WORKERS 
IN THE SOUTH OF EUROPE
Th e previous sections described the set of labour reforms introduced in the period 
between 2010 and 2013 in Southern Europe. In this section, we assess comparatively 
the impact of these reforms on the level of security enjoyed by labour market insiders 
in these countries. Following Papadopoulos (2005), we have put together two 
(composite) indexes that aim to measure the degree of security enjoyed by workers 
while in employment and while unemployed.21
Box 1. Measuring Security in Employment 
By security in employment we mean the degree of protection regular workers enjoy against the risk of 
both individual and collective dismissal. Th is is measured by a composite indicator that uses OECD 
(2013) data to measure:
– Th e protection of regular workers against individual dismissal
– Th e protection of regular workers against collective dismissal
While we broadly reproduce the methodology adopted by the OECD (2013) to measure the level of 
employment protection, our indicator does not cover the regulation of temporary forms of employment.
Following the methodology adopted by the OECD (2013: 1–2), the sub-indicator that measures the 
level of protection of regular workers against individual dismissal is composed of nine items, covering:
– Th e length of the trial period
– Th e notifi cation procedures that regulate dismissal processes, i.e. whether someone needs to be 
notifi ed/give permission for the dismissal to occur, or length of the notice period
– Th e rules that defi ne the compensation (severance pay) in case of dismissal
– Th e defi nition of fair/unfair dismissal; and the changes to the rules that defi ne the compensation in 
case of unfair dismissal
Th e sub-indicator that measures the level of protection against additional collective dismissal is 
composed of four items, covering (2013: 1–2):
– Th e defi nition of collective dismissal
– Additional notifi cation requirements in case of collective dismissal
– Additional delays involved before notice can start
– Other special costs to employers
21 While we follow the approach of Papadopoulos (2005), there are important diff erences in how 
the level of security of workers (both in employment and in unemployment) is measured. For 
instance, unlike Papadopoulos (2005: 15) our analysis of the level of security enjoyed by regular 
workers in employment does not include the regulation of temporary forms of employment. A more 
fundamental diff erence concerns the way security while unemployed is operationalised. Whereas, 
in Papadopoulos (2015: 15), the level of security in unemployment is measured by an (adjusted) 
indicator of expenditure on unemployment benefi ts and active labour market programmes, in 
this paper we look at the rules that determine the ease of access and generosity and duration of 
unemployment rates (see Box 2, Annex).
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In line with the methodology adopted by the OECD (2013: 1–2), we have given a greater weight to the 
sub-indicator that measures the protection of regular workers against individual dismissal (0.75).
Building on OECD data, the fi rst index measures the degree to which workers are 
protected against the risk of individual and collective dismissal (see Box 1). Th e 
second index uses comparative data (from MISSOC and the OECD) on labour market 
institutions to capture the degree to which unemployment insurance benefi ts protect 
workers against a sustained drop in income, which can be seen as a function of the 
ease of access to unemployment insurance and the level of income security while 
unemployed. Th e latter, in turn, is a product of the (gross) replacement rate secured 
by unemployment benefi ts and their maximum duration (see Box 2).
Box 2. Measuring Security in Unemployment
By security in unemployment, we mean the degree to which the system of unemployment protection 
protects regular workers against a sustained drop in income aft er the loss of employment. Using 
data on the rules that govern the entitlement and generosity of unemployment benefi ts (see OECD 
Benefi ts and Wages database22 and MISSOC).23 we created a composite index of security in 
unemployment. However, this is limited to unemployment insurance schemes.
Th is indicator covers two major dimensions of the protective ability of unemployment protection 
systems:
– Th e ease of access to unemployment insurance benefi ts
– Th e level of income security provided
In order to measure the ease of access to unemployment benefi ts, we created a sub-indicator that 
measures the number of social security contributions required to be entitled to unemployment 
insurance benefi ts. Th e underlying assumption is that the lower the number of contributions, the 
easier it will be for an individual to access the unemployment insurance benefi ts.
In order to make this indicator comparable across countries, we compare the ease of access for a 
‘typical’ labour market insider, with the following characteristics.
– Age 35
– Employee
– Employment and Contributory career: In uninterrupted employment for two years, with 
insurance contributions paid for the same period
In addition to this, we have made a number of simplifying assumptions:
– In cases where there is only an employment requirement, we assume that the employment period 
is equal to the contribution period.
– In cases where the legislation imposes a minimum hours of work requirement, we assume the 
individual complies with this requirement.
In order to measure the ability of unemployment systems to protect against a drop in income, we 
calculate the gross replacement rate for an individual with the following characteristics:
– Age 35
– In two earner couple, with two children
22 Available at www.oecd.org/els/benefi tsandwagesoecdindicators.htm
23 Available at www.missoc.org/MISSOC/INFORMATIONBASE/COMPARATIVETABLES/MISSOC 
DATABASE/ comparativeTableSearch.jsp
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– In unemployment for seven months
– Previous wage equal to 100 per cent of that of an average worker
– Not entitled to housing benefi ts or social assistance
As can be seen in Figure 1, in all four Southern European countries, the security of 
regular workers while in employment has been reduced. Th ere are, however, some 
important diff erences between the four countries. Th e most obvious concerns the 
greater depth of the cuts in Portugal and Greece, compared with the more moderate 
changes introduced in Spain and Italy. In addition, in contrast with Italy and Spain, 
the cuts made in Portugal to the protection against individual dismissal clearly 
outweigh the cuts made to the protection against collective dismissals. It should be 
noted that our data underestimates the impact of the reforms in Greece, as it does 
not capture the eff ect of the measures to facilitate collective dismissals introduced in 
Greece in 2013 (see Table 1, Note b, Annex).
While confi rming a reduction in the level of security enjoyed by labour market 
insiders while in unemployment, Figure 2 seems to suggest that the severity of the 
cuts made in this area are not as strong as in the fi eld of employment. In other words, 
cuts in protection against dismissal appear to be greater than cuts to the system of 
unemployment benefi ts. To a certain degree, this refl ects the fact that some of the 
most relevant reforms introduced during this period have not aff ected the security of 
regular workers as they were meant to expand unemployment protection to groups 
traditionally not covered by unemployment insurance, such as self-employed persons 
(Greece, Portugal and Spain) or apprentices (Italy) (see Section 2.2).
Figure 1. Security in employment in the South of Europe and Eurozone, 2010 and 2013
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Figure 2. Security in unemployment in the South of Europe and Eurozone, 2010 and 2013
However, what seems to happening here is a statistical artefact that results from the 
decision to use gross replacement rates to measure the degree of income security 
off ered to unemployed workers.24 As replacement rates are calculated for (ideal-
typical) individuals who received the average wage in the previous year, they are 
very vulnerable to how wages change over time. Depending on whether, and how, 
wages evolve, gross replacement rates can underestimate or overestimate the impact 
of welfare schemes on the actual living standards of individuals.
Th is limitation becomes obvious when we look at how the Greek case is reported 
here. As mentioned above, in 2012, the Greek government decided to cut by 22 per 
cent the minimum wage for unskilled workers (see Section 2.2), which is used as the 
benchmark for calculating the unemployment insurance rate (Karamessini 2012). 
However, as can be seen in Figure 2, the severity of this cut is not really refl ected 
in the indicator that measures the changes in the income security of unemployed 
workers in Greece. While, to a certain degree, this can be explained by the fact that 
there were no changes to the duration of the benefi t, it mainly refl ects the fact that, 
between 2009 and 2012, the average worker wage decreased by 9.7 per cent ‒ which 
means that the gross replacement rate underestimates the eff ect of the severe cut 
made to unemployment benefi ts on the living standards of the unemployed in this 
country.
24 Th ere is a long tradition of using gross replacement rates to compare the ability of welfare 
programmes to substitute incomes from work (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Huber and Stephens 2001), 
even if these are not without limitations (see Martin, 1996; Scruggs 2007).
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Figure 3. Security in employment vs. security in unemployment in the South of Europe and 
the Eurozone 2010 and 2013
Despite these limitations, the data does confi rm the impression that reforms introduced 
in Southern Europe in the period between 2010 and 2013 reduced the level of protection 
provided for regular workers who are unemployed. Still, as can be seen in Figure 2, 
access to unemployment benefi ts was not diminished. Th is suggests that reforms in this 
domain are less about retrenchment, and more about recalibration – i.e., reductions in 
the generosity of unemployment benefi ts to labour market insiders ran parallel with 
attempts to expand protection to previously unprotected groups (see Section 2.2).
As we have demonstrated, reforms introduced in the period between 2010 and 
2013 have meant a signifi cant reduction in the level of security enjoyed by labour 
market insiders in the South of Europe. As can be seen in Figure 3, when we put 
the developments in both areas in context we can conclude that, while there were 
important cuts in the level of security while in unemployment, the real signifi cance of 
this period of reform lies in the substantive reduction of the level of protection enjoyed 
by labour market insiders in the South of Europe. Th e question that now remains is 
what these developments signify in terms of the process of European integration.
3.1. SOUTHERN EUROPE IN CONTEXT
Having shown that the reforms that were introduced between 2010 and 2013 have 
signifi cantly reduced the level of protection for labour market insiders, in this section 
we expand our analysis to the other countries in the Eurozone (see Table 1, Annex). 
In order to make the depth of cuts more visible, we decided to plot the change in the 
level of protection given to regular workers relative to the lowest performing country 
in that year.
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Figure 4. Security in employment: Diff erence to lowest performing country between 2010 
and 2013*
Note: 
* Lowest performing country in 2010 is Estonia. Lowest performing country in 2013 is Ireland (see Table 
1, Annex).
Figure 5. Security in unemployment: Diff erence to lowest performing country between 
2010 and 2013*
Notes: 
* Lowest performing countries in 2010 are Slovak Republic/Slovenia. 
** Lowest performing country in 2013 is Ireland (see Table 1, Annex).
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Th is exercise shows that Southern European countries were not the only countries 
to reduce the level of protection given to regular workers during this period. In fact, 
almost all countries in the Eurozone did so. As can be seen in Figures 4 and 5, cuts 
to the protection of regular workers in employment are (far) more substantial, with 
the deepest cuts introduced in Belgium and in the Slovak Republic, even though they 
were not subject to conditionality from international institutions.
Similarly, the Netherlands made the second-largest cuts in the level of protection 
given to regular workers while unemployed, even though it too was not subject to 
external conditionality. Among Eurozone countries, only Ireland made deeper cuts.
4. CONCLUSION
Th e sovereign crisis that hit Europe at the beginning of the decade prompted a wave of 
labour market reforms in the South of Europe. In this article, we showed that reforms 
introduced between 2010 and 2013 amounted to an important reduction in the level 
of security for labour market insiders both in employment and while unemployed. 
We then showed that this reduction was not exclusive to the South of Europe, which 
suggests an ongoing process of moving towards a model of labour market regulation 
characterised by lower levels of security in employment within the Eurozone.
While relevant, these fi ndings must be put into perspective. First, the methodology 
used to measure the generosity of unemployment benefi ts tends to underestimate the 
eff ect of absolute cuts in the level of unemployment benefi ts in some countries (in 
particular Greece) on the income protection of labour market insiders when unemployed. 
Second, and most important, the above indicator cannot capture important gaps in the 
coverage of unemployment benefi ts in Southern Europe. With an unemployment rate 
of 26 per cent and a coverage rate by unemployment benefi ts of only 9 per cent of the 
unemployed in August 2014, Greece is the extreme case in this respect. 
Last but not least, the developments reported here cover only half the story. For 
instance, our analysis does not cover changes made to the status of a special group of 
labour market insiders: public sector workers. In Greece, for example, employees in 
public enterprises saw the abolition of all clauses on tenure provided for by collective 
agreements and saw their labour contracts transformed into open-ended ones; while 
in public administration, labour reserve and mobility schemes were created in order 
to receive personnel made redundant, of whom a certain number have been dismissed 
(Karamessini, 2015).
Most importantly, the developments reported here do not take into account 
changes to the policies that regulate the security provided to labour market outsiders. 
Studying these changes is important in order to examine whether cuts in the security 
of labour market insiders are part of a de-segmentation strategy, or if they go hand-
in-hand with a similar deterioration of employment conditions at the lower end of the 
labour market.
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Still, these results raise important questions regarding the process of institutional 
change currently underway in these four Southern European countries. As shown 
above (see Section 3), the pattern of change in employment protection legislation 
‒ clearly focused on retrenchment ‒ is quite diff erent from the recalibration that 
characterises change in the system of unemployment protection. Despite the 
introduction of cuts in the generosity and duration of benefi ts, there are also eff orts 
to expand unemployment protection coverage to previously unprotected groups. Th is 
raises the issue of whether these eff orts to expand unemployment protection coverage 
are (a) the product of compensation strategies (Glatzer, 1999; Pierson, 1994) adopted 
by policy-makers to make the introduction of cuts to unemployment protection more 
easily acceptable; (b) a refl ection of a shift  in the balance of power between labour 
market insiders, outsiders and employers, given that labour market institutions 
are an arena for the power dynamics between diff erent social groups (Korpi 2001; 
Rueda 2005); or (c) simply, the result of a policy response to the rapid growth in 
unemployment in these countries to unprecedented levels.
Th e results in this paper also pose the question of the degree to which these 
developments are refl ective of a new model of economic governance in Europe and 
an external policy agenda imposed through the conditionality associated with the 
provision of fi nancial assistance, and the extent to which they refl ect internal dynamics 
among local actors. Finally, and consequentially, these results raise the fundamental 
question of whether this period of reform signifi es the dissolution of the Southern 
European model of labour market regulation, characterised by the protection of 
labour market insiders along with insecurity for outsiders.
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